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Abstract
In this paper, we develop a new method for ﬁnd-
ing the optimal bidding strategy in sequential
auctions, using a dynamic programming tech-
nique. The existing method assumes that the util-
ity of a user is represented in an additive form.
From this assumption, the remaining endowment
of money must be explicitly represented in each
state, and the calculation of the optimal bidding
strategy becomes time-consuming when the ini-
tial endowment of money m becomes large.
Morespeciﬁcally, wedevelop anewproblem for-
malization whereby the utility of a user can be
represented in a quasi-linear form. By assum-
ing a quasi-linear utility, the payment can be rep-
resented as a state-transition cost. Accordingly,
we can avoid explicitly representing the remain-
ing endowment of money. Experimental evalua-
tions show that we can obtain more than an m-
fold speed-up in the computation time. Further-
more, we have developed a method for obtain-
ing a semi-optimal bidding strategy under budget
constraints, and have experimentally conﬁrmed
the efﬁcacy of this method.
1 Introduction
Electronic Commerce (EC) has rapidly grown with the ex-
pansion of the Internet. Among these activities, auctions
have recently achieved huge popularity, and commercial
auction sites (e.g., eBay; Yahoo!Auctions) have been very
successful and continue to expand. Various studies on In-
ternet auctions have already been made, from theoretical
studies to practical studies (Guttman, Moukas, & Maes
1998; Harkavy, Kikuchi, & Tygar 1998; Sakurai, Yokoo,
& Matsubara 1999; Sandholm 1996; Wurman, Walsh, &
Wellman 1998; Yokoo, Sakurai, & Matsubara 2000).
Due to the progress of Internet auctions, a user can par-
ticipate in many auctions held around the world. In some
cases, such a user may have complementary/substitutional
preferences on multiple items. For example, in FCC spec-
trum auctions (Milgrom 1998), a bidder may desire li-
censes for adjoining regions simultaneously (i.e., these li-
censes are complementary), while he/she is indifferent to
which particular channel he/she receives (channels are sub-
stitutional).
One method for incorporating such com-
plementary/substitutional preferences over multiple items
is to use a combinatorial auction protocol. Research on
combinatorial auctions has lately attracted considerable at-
tention (Klemperer 1999; MacKie-Mason & Varian 1994;
Milgrom 1998; Varian 1995). With a combinatorial auc-
tionprotocol, multiple itemswithinterdependentvaluesare
sold simultaneously and bidders are allowed to bid on any
combination of items. Therefore, combinatorial auctions
tend to increase the participants’ utilities and the revenue
of the seller.
However, in practice, several difﬁculties emerge when us-
ing combinatorial auction protocols. First, combinatorial
auction protocols are very different and complicated, com-
pared with other auction protocols used in commercial auc-
tion sites. Therefore, introducing a combinatorial auction
protocol requires that both sellers and bidders drastically
modify their existing systems, and learn the new protocol.
In addition, determining the winners and their payments
in combinatorial auctions is NP-hard, and requires consid-
erable computational efforts (Fujishima, Leyton-Brown, &
Shoham 1999; Rothkopf, Pekeˇ c, & Harstad 1998; Sand-
holm 1999). Furthermore, if multiple items are to be sold
by different sellers at different auction sites at different
points in time, bidding for these bundles is virtually im-
possible.
On the other hand, in sequential auctions (Klemperer
1999), a set of items is sold in sequence. A bidder bids
for items in a speciﬁc, known order, and he/she can choose
his/her bids depending on past successes/failures. We can
consider that a sequential auction mechanism is more ap-
propriate to model existing Internet auctions. An approach
for ﬁnding the optimal bidding strategy is proposed in(Boutilier, Goldszmidt, & Sabata 1999), using a dynamic
programming technique for sequential auctions under sev-
eral assumptions. This approach, however, assumes that
the utility of the user is represented in an additive form, and
accordingly, the remaining endowment of money must be
explicitly represented for each state considered in the dy-
namic programming procedure. Therefore, the larger the
initial endowment of money m becomes, the more time-
consuming the calculation of the optimal bidding strategy
gets.
In this paper, we develop a new problem formalization that
can reduce the number of states by 1/m. In this formal-
ization, we assume that the utility of the user can be rep-
resented in a quasi-linear form (which is an important sub-
class of an additive form). By representing the payment of
the user as a state-transition cost, we can avoid explicitly
representing the remaining endowment of money in each
state. Experimental evaluations show that we can obtain
more than an m-fold speed-up in the computation time.
The assumption of a quasi-linear utility is so general that
we can deal with many cases of sequential auctions. How-
ever, there exists one practically important case where the
quasi-linear representation fails to formalize, i.e., the case
with budget constraints. To resolve this problem, we have
developed a method for obtaining a semi-optimal bidding
strategy under budget constraints, and have experimentally
veriﬁed the efﬁciency of this method.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we introduce basic terms and deﬁnitions. In Section 3,
we show the problem formalization and method for ﬁnd-
ing the optimal strategy, using the dynamic programming
technique described in (Boutilier, Goldszmidt, & Sabata
1999). In Section 4, we describe a new problem formal-
ization whereby the utility of the user can be represented
in a quasi-linear form, and show that we can reduce the
number of states considered in the dynamic programming
procedure. Furthermore, we show that we can obtain more
than an m-fold speed-up in the computation time by exper-
iment. In Section 5, we describe the method for obtaining
a semi-optimal bidding strategy under budget constraints,
and show experimental evaluations.
2 Basic Models
First, we introduce several terms and deﬁnitions used in
this paper. We assume that there are n items denoted by
r1,r 2,...,r n. The individual auction Ai for each item ri
is executed sequentially in the increasing order of i, and all
bidders know the order in advance. To simplify the prob-
lem, we assume that Ai is a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction
(Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green 1995). In a ﬁrst-price
sealed-bid auction, everyone submits a bid without know-
ing the others’ bids. The highest bidder wins and pays the
amount of his/her own bid.
In this paper, we focus on a speciﬁc agent and consider
a method for ﬁnding the optimal bidding strategy for the
agent. For a set of items Rs, which is a subset of all items
R = {r1,r 2,...,r n}, we represent the valuation of the
subset Rs for the agent as v(Rs). We assume that the
agent knows the exact value of v(Rs), and that it is in-
dependent of other agents’ valuations. Such items (goods)
are called private-value goods (Mas-Colell, Whinston, &
Green 1995).
In addition, we assume that this agent has a distribution
function Fi(h) to predict the highest bids of other agents
in Ai. We also assume that the distributions of the highest
bids of multiple items are mutually independent. For sim-
plicity, we assume that the agent can win in cases of ties.
Therefore, when the agent bids z for an item ri, the proba-
bility that the agent wins the item ri is given by Fi(z), and
this probability is independent of the items the agent has
obtained so far.
As shown in (Boutilier, Goldszmidt, & Sabata 1999), these
assumptions are rather strong. In particular, we assume that
other agents do not strategically change their bids consid-
ering the bid of this agent. However, we can consider that
the distribution functions only reﬂect the subjective prob-
abilities of the agent, and are not necessarily correct. As
shown in (Boutilier, Goldszmidt, & Sabata 1999), the agent
can learn/adjust these distribution functions through expe-
rience.
3 Dynamic Programming in an Additive
Form
In (Boutilier, Goldszmidt, & Sabata 1999), a method for
ﬁnding the optimal bidding strategy, using a dynamic pro-
gramming technique (Bellman 1957) is proposed based on
the assumption that the utility of an agent is represented
in an additive form. Dynamic programming techniques
have been widely used to determine the optimal strategy
in Markov decision problems (Puterman 1994). A Markov
decision problem is to determine a sequence of actions that
can optimize the sum of rewards/costs, given a set of states,
a set of available actions for each state, the transition prob-
abilities between states, and the rewards/costs associated
with state transitions.
Assuming that after sequential auctions, an agent has ob-
tained a set of items Rs and the remaining endowment of
money is d, a utility function in an additive form can be
represented as follows.
v(Rs)+f(d)
where f is some function attaching a utility to the remain-
ing endowment of money.
To ﬁnd the optimal bidding strategy, the auction process is
divided into n +1stages, i.e., n stages at which biddingdecisions must be made, and a terminal stage at the end of
all of the auctions. We use time index 0 ≤ t ≤ n to refer to
stages, i.e., time t refers to the point at which auction At+1
for item rt+1 is about to begin. At time t, given the set of
items Rs obtained so far, and the remaining endowment of
money d, let <R s,d> t be the state.
Bidding strategy π maps a state to a bid, i.e., for a state
<R s,d > t, π(<R s,d > t)=z means that according
to the bidding strategy π, the agent should bid z for rt+1.
Furthermore, we represent the expected utility for execut-
ing bidding strategy π from the current state <R s,d> t as
V π(<R s,d> t).
The optimal bidding strategy is deﬁned as follows. For a
state <R s,d> n in the terminal stage n, V (<R s,d> n)
is deﬁned as v(Rs)+f(d).
Q(<R s,d> t,z)=
Ft+1(z) · V (<R s ∪{ rt+1},d− z> t+1)
+( 1− Ft+1(z)) · V (<R s,d> t+1)
V (<R s,d> t) = max
z≤d
Q(<R s,d> t,z)
π(<R s,d> t) = argmax
z≤d
Q(<R s,d> t,z)
The agent can determine the optimal bidding strategy π
using a method called value iteration (Puterman 1994).
V (<R s,d > t) represents the expected utility in the state
<R s,d> t when the agent uses the optimal bidding strat-
egy π. In this formalization, we assume that the state tran-
sition reward/cost is 0.
In Figure 1 (a), we show an example of the optimal bidding
strategy in the following simple problem setting. In this
example, there are two items r1 and r2, and the initial en-
dowment of money is 4. The valuation for the set {r1,r 2}
is 4, and it is 0 for the other sets (all-or-nothing). The high-
est bids of the other agents for each item are 1 or 2 with
equal probability 1/2, i.e., since we assume ties are wins,
when the agent bids 2, its winning probability is 1, and if
the agent bids 1, its winning probability is 1/2. We assume
the utility for the remaining endowment of money d in the
ﬁnal state is d itself, i.e., f(d)=d.
In Figure 1(a), we show only the states that can occur when
the agent takes the optimal bidding strategy. For each state,
we show the expected utility V and the optimal bid π(·).
Each arrow between states represents a possible transition,
and the value near the arrow represents the transition prob-
ability. In this strategy, the agent ﬁrst bids 1 for r1. The
agent can obtain the item with the probability of 0.5. If
the agent can obtain r1, it bids 2 for r2 in the next stage
to make sure that it can obtain both items. In this case, its
utility becomes 4+1=5 . Since having only r2 is useless,
if the agent cannot obtain r1, it bids 0 for r2, i.e., it does not
participate in the auction. In this case, the utility becomes
equal to the initial endowment of money 4. As a result, the
expected utility becomes 1/2 × 5+1 /2 × 4=4 .5.
In this problem formalization, the number of states at stage
tis given by (2t−1)×(m+1)+1, where mis the initial en-
dowment of money. This is because at stage t, there are 2t
possible combinations of obtained items. For each combi-
nation of items, the variation of the remaining endowment
of money is m+1, excluding the case that the agent obtains
nothing. Therefore, thetotalnumberofstatesisO(m×2n),
which means that when the initial endowment of money is
large, ﬁnding the optimal bidding strategy becomes time-
consuming, as the number of states gets large.
One way to reduce the number of states is to determine bids
using coarse units, e.g., considering only bids that are mul-
tiples of $10. However, unless other agents are also bidding
in the same style, we cannot guarantee the optimality of the
obtained strategy.
4 Dynamic Programming in a Quasi-linear
Form
4.1 Basic Ideas
In this section, we introduce a new problem formalization
whereby the utility of an agent can be represented in a
quasi-linear form (Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green 1995),
and show that we can reduce the number of states consid-
ered in the dynamic programming procedure by 1/m.
The utility of an agent is called quasi-linear if it can be
represented in the following form.
v(Rs) − ZRs
Here, we represent the sum of payments for the subset Rs
as ZRs. We deﬁne the agent’s utility as the difference be-
tween the sum of the valuation for the allocated items and
the payment. The assumption that an agent’s utility can be
represented in a quasi-linear form has been widely used in
many microeconomics studies (Mas-Colell, Whinston, &
Green 1995).
Clearly, the quasi-linear form is one instance of the addi-
tive form. In a representation using an additive form, if we
change the origin point to measure the utility to the util-
ity of the initial endowment of money so that not partic-
ipating in the auctions has 0 utility, the utility for obtain-
ing the set of items Rs by paying ZRs is represented as
v(Rs)+f(m − ZRs) − f(m). Therefore, if we assume
f(x)=x, a representation in an additive form becomes
equivalent to that in a quasi-linear form.
The assumption that the utility of an agent can be repre-
sented in a quasi-linear form is reasonable if the payment
for auctioned items is relatively small and has little impact
on other items sold outside of the current auctions (more
precisely, there exists no income effect (Mas-Colell, Whin-
ston, & Green 1995)).<φ ,4>
0
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Figure 1: An Example of States and Optimal Strategy
4.2 Details of the Dynamic Programming Model
By assuming that the utility of an agent is represented in
a quasi-linear form, and that there are no additional con-
straints on the amount of bids that the agent can make, the
problem of ﬁnding the optimal bidding strategy, using a dy-
namic programming technique, can be deﬁned as follows.
If the utility of the agent can be represented in a quasi-
linear form, for two states in the terminal stage n, which
obtain the same set of items represented as <R s,d > n
and <R s,d   >n, the difference of the utilities of these
two states is identical to the difference of the remaining
endowment of money d and d . From this fact, we can
show that for two states in stage t, which obtain the same
set of items represented as <R s,d > t and <R s,d   >t,
the optimal strategies from these states must be identical,
regardless of whether the agent has obtained Rs for free, or
has paid a million dollars so far.
We can avoid explicitly representing the remaining endow-
ment of money in each state by representing the payment
as a state-transition cost. Let <R s >t denote a state where
an agent obtains Rs at stage t. A bidding strategy π maps
a state to a bidding price, i.e., π(<R s >t)=z means
that according to bidding strategy π, the agent should bid z
for item rt+1 if the agent obtains Rs so far. Furthermore,
let V π(<R s >t) indicate the expected utility obtained by
executing strategy π from state <R s >t. The expected
utility of strategy π of the initial state is represented as
V π(< ∅ >0).
Then, we can calculate the optimal bidding strategy using
value iteration in a similar way to the additive utility case.
We set V (<R s >n)=v(Rs) for state <R s >n in the
terminal stage n.
Q(<R s >t,z)=
Ft+1(z) · (V (<R s ∪{ rt+1} >t+1) − z)
+( 1− Ft+1(z)) · V (<R s >t+1)
V (<R s >t) = max
z Q(<R s >t,z)
π(<R s >t) = argmax
z Q(<R s >t,z)
where V (<R s >t) denotes the expected utility of state
<R s >t. In performing the value iteration, we can set the
upper-bound of bidding price z to V (<R s∪{rt+1} >t+1)
− V (<R s >t+1).
Clearly, bidding more than this value gives a smaller ex-
pected utility than a bid of 0. On the other hand, if we as-
sume that the utility of the agent is represented in an addi-
tive form, as discussed in (Boutilier, Goldszmidt, & Sabata
1999), there is no obvious method to set a good upper-
bound of the bidding price. One obvious upper-bound of
the bidding price can be the utility of having all items, if
we assume f(x)=x. However, this upper-bound tends to
be much larger than the upper-bound available in the quasi-
linear representation.
Figure 1(b) shows an example of an optimal strategy in the
same problem setting as Figure 1(a). As in Figure 1(a), for
each state, we show the expected utility V and the opti-
mal bid π. Each arrow between states represents a possible
transition, and a value near an arrow represents the transi-
tion probability.
Clearly, the optimal bidding strategies are identical for both
(a) and (b). Moreover, if we recalculate the expected utility
for each state in (a) by setting the valuation of the current
endowment of money to the origin, the expected utilities V
for the corresponding states in (a) and (b) become identical.
For example, in (a), the endowment of money of the initial
state is 4, and V is 4.5. Therefore, by participating in this
auction, the agent can increase its utility (on average) by
0.5. This amount is identical to that for the initial state in
(b).
In this problem formalization, the number of states at stage
t is given by 2t, and therefore, the total number of states be-
comes O(2n). Accordingly, compared with the case of anagent’s utility represented in an additive form, the number
of states in a quasi-linear form is reduced by 1/m.
4.3 Evaluation
In this section, we show evaluation results to verify the ef-
ﬁciency of our new problem formalization.
Let n be the number of items and m be the initial endow-
ment of money. We assume that n is an even number, and
the valuation of the set of items r1,r 3,...,r n−1, and the
set of items r2,r 4,...,r n is 100 × n/2. We also assume
that having any additional items to these sets does not in-
crease the utility. More speciﬁcally, if the agent has all of
the items, its utility is still 100 × n/2 (these two sets are
substitutional). If any item in each set cannot be obtained,
the utility becomes 0 (i.e., the items in each set are comple-
mentary). Furthermore, we assume that the highest bids of
other agents for each item are randomly distributed in the
range of [0,100].
Figure 2 shows the computation time for the quasi-linear
form and for the additive form, where m is set to 500, 1000,
and1500, byvaryingthenumberofitemsn. Intheproblem
formalization using the additive form, we do not consider
bids larger than 100 × n/2. We run our experiments on a
workstation (296 MHz Sun UltraSparc II) with a program
written in Lisp.
We can see that in the quasi-linear form, we can reduce the
number of states by 1/m, and we can obtain more than an
m-fold speed-up in the computation time. This is because
not only the number of states, but also the number of bids
considered in each state is reduced.
Figure 2: Comparison on Computation Time
5 Incorporating Budget Constraints
5.1 Basic Ideas
We showed that if we assume that the utility of an agent
can be represented in a quasi-linear form, we can use the
compact problem representation introduced in the previous
section, and canreduce the numberofstates by1/m, which
enables us to efﬁciently obtain the optimal bidding strategy
by using a dynamic programming technique.
The assumption of a quasi-linear utility is so general that
we can deal with many cases of sequential auctions. How-
ever, there exists one practically important case where the
quasi-linear representation fails to formalize, i.e., the case
with budget constraints. A case with budget constraints
means that the sum of each bidder’s payment must not ex-
ceed his/her initial endowment of money.
IfweusetheproblemrepresentationdescribedinSection3,
where an agent’s utility is represented in an additive form,
wecanobtainanoptimalbiddingstrategythatsatisﬁesbud-
get constraints, because each state explicitly speciﬁes the
remaining endowment of money, and we can choose a bid
so that it will not exceed the endowment of money in each
state. On the other hand, the optimal bidding strategy ob-
tained by the new problem representation might be infea-
sible under budget constraints, i.e., too much money might
be spent in some cases.
In this section, we develop a method for obtaining a semi-
optimalbiddingstrategyπ  that satisﬁes budget constraints,
by modifying the strategy π that is obtained using the
method described in Section 4, i.e., by assuming that an
agent’s utility can be represented in a quasi-linear form,
and that there are no budget constraints. More speciﬁcally,
wecalculate the upper-boundofa bidineach statebased on
the bids speciﬁed by π. Then, we ﬁnd the optimal bid under
this upper-bound using a dynamic programming procedure
in order to satisfy the budget constraints. If we can set ap-
propriate upper-bounds, we can ﬁnd the optimal bidding
strategy satisfying the budget constraints. However, be-
cause our method heuristically determines upper-bounds,
we cannot guarantee the optimality of the obtained strat-
egy.
This method applies the dynamic programming procedure
twice: once for obtaining strategy π, and once for obtaining
π  by modifying π. The theoretical/experimental analysis
in the previous section showed that our newly introduced
problem representation gives more than an m-fold speed-
up compared with the case of an agent’s utility represented
in an additive form. Therefore, we can expect our method
to still attain about an m/2-fold speed-up in the total com-
putation time.5.2 Details of the Algorithm
As described in the previous subsection, we ﬁrst obtain the
optimal bidding strategy π, which does not consider budget
constraints. Then, for each state, we sequentially apply a
dynamic programming procedure fromstates in stage n−1.
For a state <R s >t, Zpre denotes the sum of the pay-
ments based on π from the initial state < ∅ >0 to this state
(excluding the payment in this state), zopt denotes the op-
timal amount of the bid in this state speciﬁed by π, and
Zpast denotes the maximal value of the sum of the pay-
ments for each of the possible paths branching from the
state <R s ∪{ rt+1} >t+1, i.e., the state where the agent
will transit if it can win item rt+1. Note that the payments
used for calculating Zpast have already been adjusted to
consider budget constraints. In addition, we denote the
upper-bound of the total budget as Zbud.
For each state <R s >t, we set the upper-bound of a bid
zmax as follows.
zmax = zopt × (Zbud − Zpast)/(Zpre + zopt)
The meaning of this formula is as follows. For all states
after t +1 , the amounts of the bids have already been ad-
justed. Therefore, to satisfy the budget constraints for all
cases, the sum of the payments from the initial state to the
state <R s ∪{rt+1} >t+1 must be smaller than or equal to
Zbud−Zpast. The problem is how to distribute this amount
among the states from < ∅ >0 to <R s >t. In this method,
we simply prorate this amount based on the bids speciﬁed
in π.
For all bids z ≤ zmax, we calculate Q(<R s >t,z),
choose the best bid, and update V (<R s >t).
5.3 Evaluation
This subsection shows experimental evaluations to conﬁrm
the efﬁcacy of our method for ﬁnding semi-optimal strate-
gies under budget constraints.
In Figure 3, we compare the expected utilities obtained by
the method described in the previous subsection (prorated),
the method in which an agent’s utility is represented in an
additive form (additive), and a very simple trivial method
(trivial) that simply uses the optimal bidding strategy π.
More speciﬁcally, in the trivial method, the agent submits
bids according to π as long as it has a sufﬁcient endowment
of money. If the remaining endowment of money becomes
smaller than the amount of the optimal bid, the agent sim-
ply bids for all of the remaining endowment of money, and
if the amount becomes 0, the agent stops participating in
the remaining auctions.
We set the number of items to 9. For the agent, the val-
uation for each of the following three sets of items, i.e.,
{r1,r 4,r 7}, {r2,r 5,r 8}, and {r3,r 6,r 9}, is 300. We as-
sume that having any additional items except these sets
does not increase the utility. More speciﬁcally, if the agent
has all of the items, its utility is still 300 (these three sets
are substitutional). In addition, if any item in each set can-
not be obtained, the utility becomes 0. Furthermore, we
assume that the highest bids of other agents for each item
are randomly distributed in the range of [0,100].
Without budget constraints, the possible maximal sum of
the payments for the optimal strategy is 251. In Figure 3,
we show the expected utilities of the obtained strategies for
three methods (additive, prorated, and trivial), by varying
the budget from 10 to 260. We can see that the result of
the prorated method is very close to the optimal result ob-
tained by the additive method. On the other hand, the ex-
pected utility of the trivial method can be negative, since
the agent tends to obtain only a part of the complementary
items. In Figure 4, we show the computation time for these
three methods. The required time for the trivial method is
constant. For the prorated method, the required time for
the ﬁrst application of the dynamic procedure is equivalent
to that for the trivial method, but the required time for the
second application varies according to the budget. We can
see that in the additive method, the computation time grows
approximately linear to the square of the budget.
Of course, this evaluation is not extensive enough. We need
to clarify the efﬁciency of this method in a variety of prob-
lem settings. In particular, in the example setting shown
here, the winning probability changes very slowly when
the agent changes its bid, and accordingly, the simple pro-
rated method works very well. If the winning probability
changes radically by a small change of the bid, it is con-
ceivable that we will need a more sophisticated method
to set the upper-bound of the bid to consider the relative
impact of decreasing each bid. We are currently develop-
ing/evaluating such a method.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a method for determining
the optimal strategy, using a dynamic programming tech-
nique in sequential auctions. The existing method assumes
that the utility of a user is represented in an additive form,
and accordingly, the remaining endowment of money must
be explicitly represented in each state considered in the dy-
namic programming procedure. Therefore, the larger the
initial endowment of money m becomes, the more time-
consuming the calculation of the optimal bidding strategy
gets, since the number of states increases in proportion to
m. To put it concretely, suppose that there are n items and
the initial endowment of money is m. Then the number of
states considered is O(m × 2n).
In this paper, we have developed a new problem formaliza-
tion that can reduce the number of states by 1/m. In this
formalization, we assume that the utility of a user can beFigure 3: Comparison of the Solution Quality
Figure 4: Comparison of the Computation Time (with
Budget Constraints)
represented in a quasi-linear form (which is an important
subclass of an additive form). By representing the pay-
ment of the user as a state-transition cost, we can avoid
explicitly representing the remaining endowment of money
in each state. Experimental evaluations showed that we can
obtain more than an m-fold speed-up in the computation
time. Furthermore, we have developed a method for ob-
taining a semi-optimal bidding strategy under budget con-
straints, and have experimentally conﬁrmed the efﬁcacy of
this method.
We are currently elaborating the method to ﬁnd a semi-
optimal bidding strategy under budget constraints, and
evaluating several alternative methods in various problem
settings. One future direction of this study is to develop a
method for learning the optimal bidding strategy from ex-
perience, without assuming that the agent knows the distri-
butions of the highest bids of other agents in advance. We
are currently investigating a method that utilizes reinforce-
ment learning (Barto, Bradtke, & Singh 1995) techniques.
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